کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
962544 930119 2008 14 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Tax competition when firms choose their organizational form: Should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed?
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Tax competition when firms choose their organizational form: Should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed?
چکیده انگلیسی

We analyze a sequential game between two symmetric countries when firms can invest in a multinational structure that confers tax savings. Governments are able to commit to long-run tax discrimination policies before firms' decisions are made and before statutory capital tax rates are chosen non-cooperatively. Whether a coordinated reduction in the tax preferences granted to mobile firms is beneficial or harmful for the competing countries depends critically on the elasticity with which the firms' organizational structure responds to tax discrimination incentives. A model extension with countries of different size shows that small countries are likely to grant more tax preferences than larger ones, along with having lower effective tax rates.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of International Economics - Volume 74, Issue 1, January 2008, Pages 188–201
نویسندگان
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