کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
962833 | 930157 | 2007 | 19 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Trade agreements with domestic policies as disguised protection
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
WTO rules prohibit “disguised protection” in the form of domestic policies. How then do governments cooperate over trade and domestic policies when none can verify whether a nation's domestic tax reduction is a protective measure or a reaction to a production externality? In this paper, each government privately observes whether a production externality associated with its import-competing good is high or low. This paper finds that in an optimal agreement, disguised protection with domestic policies is never used by governments with a high externality, and is never commonly realized. Moreover, in an optimal agreement, tariffs may be conditional on domestic policies.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of International Economics - Volume 71, Issue 1, 8 March 2007, Pages 241-259
Journal: Journal of International Economics - Volume 71, Issue 1, 8 March 2007, Pages 241-259
نویسندگان
Gea M. Lee,