کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
963271 1479089 2006 20 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Devaluation without common knowledge
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Devaluation without common knowledge
چکیده انگلیسی
In an economy with a fixed exchange rate regime that suffers a random adverse shock, we study the strategies of imperfectly and sequentially informed speculators that may trigger an endogenous devaluation before it occurs exogenously. The game played by the speculators has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium which is a strongly rational expectation equilibrium in the set of all strategies with delay. Uncertainty about the extent to which the Central Bank is ready to defend the peg extends the ex ante mean delay between the exogenous shock and the devaluation. We determine endogenously the rate of devaluation.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of International Economics - Volume 70, Issue 2, December 2006, Pages 470-489
نویسندگان
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