کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
966193 | 930934 | 2012 | 13 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Recurrent crises in global games
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
ریاضیات کاربردی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Recurrent crises in global games Recurrent crises in global games](/preview/png/966193.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
Global games have unique equilibria in which aggregate behavior changes sharply when an underlying random fundamental crosses some threshold. This property relies on the existence of dominance regions: all players have a highest and lowest action that, for some fundamentals, is strictly dominant. But if the fundamental follows a random walk, it eventually spends nearly all of its time in these regions: crises gradually disappear. We obtain recurring crises by adding a single large player who lacks dominance regions. We also show that in order to obtain recurring crises, one must either relax dominance regions or restrict to fundamentals that continually return to or cross over a fixed region.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics - Volume 48, Issue 5, October 2012, Pages 309-321
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics - Volume 48, Issue 5, October 2012, Pages 309-321
نویسندگان
David M. Frankel,