کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
966321 | 1479275 | 2009 | 9 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
On the equivalence of the Arrow impossibility theorem and the Brouwer fixed point theorem when individual preferences are weak orders
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
ریاضیات کاربردی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله

چکیده انگلیسی
We will show that in the case where there are two individuals and three alternatives (or under the assumption of the free-triple property), and individual preferences are weak orders (which may include indifference relations), the Arrow impossibility theorem [Arrow, K.J., 1963. Social Choice and Individual Values, second ed. Yale University Press] that there exists no binary social choice rule which satisfies the conditions of transitivity, Pareto principle, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and non-existence of dictator is equivalent to the Brouwer fixed point theorem on a 2-dimensional ball (circle). Our study is an application of ideas by Chichilnisky [Chichilnisky, G., 1979. On fixed points and social choice paradoxes. Economics Letters 3, 347-351] to a discrete social choice problem, and also it is in line with the work by Baryshnikov [Baryshnikov, Y., 1993. Unifying impossibility theorems: a topological approach. Advances in Applied Mathematics 14, 404-415].
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics - Volume 45, Issues 3â4, 20 March 2009, Pages 241-249
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics - Volume 45, Issues 3â4, 20 March 2009, Pages 241-249
نویسندگان
Yasuhito Tanaka,