کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
966407 | 1479278 | 2008 | 12 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Parimutuel betting under asymmetric information
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
ریاضیات کاربردی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Parimutuel betting under asymmetric information Parimutuel betting under asymmetric information](/preview/png/966407.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper examines simple parimutuel betting games under asymmetric information, with particular attention to differences between markets in which bets are submitted simultaneously versus sequentially. In the simultaneous parimutuel betting market, all (symmetric and asymmetric) Bayesian-Nash equilibria are generically characterized as a function of the number of bettors and the quality of their private information. There always exists a separating equilibrium, in which all bettors follow their private signals. This equilibrium is unique if the number of bettors is sufficiently large. In the sequential framework, earlier bets have information externalities, because they may reveal private information of bettors. They also have payoff externalities, because they affect the betting odds. One effect of these externalities is that the separating equilibrium disappears if the number of betting periods is sufficiently large.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics - Volume 44, Issues 7â8, July 2008, Pages 733-744
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics - Volume 44, Issues 7â8, July 2008, Pages 733-744
نویسندگان
Frédéric Koessler, Charles Noussair, Anthony Ziegelmeyer,