کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
966472 | 930972 | 2007 | 9 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Pure strategy equilibria in games with countable actions
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موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
ریاضیات کاربردی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Pure strategy equilibria in games with countable actions Pure strategy equilibria in games with countable actions](/preview/png/966472.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
In this paper, we extend the Radner-Rosenthal theorem with finite action spaces on the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium for a finite game to the case that the action space is countable and complete. We also prove the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium for a game with a continuum of players of finite types and with a countable and complete action space. To work with the countably infinite action spaces, we prove some regularity properties on the set of distributions induced by the measurable selections of a correspondence with a countable range by using the Bollobás-Varopoulos extension of the marriage lemma.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics - Volume 43, Issue 2, February 2007, Pages 192-200
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics - Volume 43, Issue 2, February 2007, Pages 192-200
نویسندگان
Haomiao Yu, Zhixiang Zhang,