کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
966640 | 931090 | 2013 | 10 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market
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موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
ریاضیات کاربردی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
This paper studies the properties of the steady state equilibrium in a bilateral matching market with ex ante investments at the market entry stage. Investment incentives depend on search frictions because both parties in a match are partially locked-in when they bargain over the joint surplus from their sunk investments. The associated holdup problem is more important for the long side of the market. In the extreme case of perfectly substitutable investments only the agents on the short side make investments. When market frictions become negligible, the market equilibrium approaches the Walrasian outcome.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics - Volume 49, Issue 4, August 2013, Pages 302-311
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics - Volume 49, Issue 4, August 2013, Pages 302-311
نویسندگان
Helmut Bester,