کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
966663 1479270 2014 6 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in games with private information: A complete characterization
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
در وجود تعادل استراتژی خالص در بازی با اطلاعات خصوصی: مشخصات کامل
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه ریاضیات ریاضیات کاربردی
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper reports a definitive resolution to the question of the existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in games with a finite number of players, each with a compact metric action set and private information. The resolution hinges on saturated spaces. If the individual spaces of information are saturated, there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium in such a game; and if there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium for the class of games under consideration and with uncountable action sets, the spaces of private information must be saturated. As such, the paper offers a complete characterization of a longstanding question, and offers another game-theoretic characterization of the saturation property, one that complements a recent result of Keisler-Sun (2009) on large non-anonymous games with complete information.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics - Volume 50, January 2014, Pages 197-202
نویسندگان
, ,