کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
966697 | 931097 | 2011 | 7 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter
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موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
ریاضیات کاربردی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
We characterize the structure of optimal assignment rules when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency (e.g., rent-seeking) are present. We find that the optimal structure critically depends on how the hazard rate of the value distribution behaves, and that it is often optimal to use probabilistic assignment rules so that the winner of the object is not always the one with the highest valuation. We also find that the inefficiency of the optimal assignment rule decreases as the variability of the value distribution increases.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics - Volume 47, Issue 6, December 2011, Pages 670-676
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics - Volume 47, Issue 6, December 2011, Pages 670-676
نویسندگان
Kiho Yoon,