کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
966803 | 931107 | 2010 | 12 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Sabotage in dynamic tournaments
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موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
ریاضیات کاربردی
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چکیده انگلیسی
This paper studies sabotage in a dynamic tournament. Three players compete in two rounds. In the final round, a player who is leading in the race, but not yet beyond the reach of his competitors, is sabotaged more heavily. As a consequence, if all players start off at the same position, they do not work productively or sabotage at all in the first round. Thus sabotage is not only directly destructive, but also depresses incentives to work productively. If players are heterogeneous ex ante, sabotage activities in the first round may be concentrated against an underdog, contrary to findings from static tournaments.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics - Volume 46, Issue 2, 20 March 2010, Pages 179-190
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics - Volume 46, Issue 2, 20 March 2010, Pages 179-190
نویسندگان
Oliver Gürtler, Johannes Münster,