کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
966946 | 931125 | 2008 | 13 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Optimal risk taking in an uneven tournament game with risk averse players
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
ریاضیات کاربردی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Optimal risk taking in an uneven tournament game with risk averse players Optimal risk taking in an uneven tournament game with risk averse players](/preview/png/966946.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
We analyze the optimal choice of risk in a two-stage tournament game between two players that have different concave utility functions. At the first stage, both players simultaneously choose risk. At the second stage, both observe overall risk and simultaneously decide on effort or investment. The results show that those two effects which mainly determine risk taking - an effort effect and a likelihood effect - are strictly interrelated. This finding sharply contrasts with existing results on risk taking in tournament games with symmetric equilibrium efforts where such linkage can never arise. Conditions are derived under which this linkage leads to a reversed likelihood effect so that the favorite (underdog) can increase his winning probability by increasing (decreasing) risk which is impossible in a completely symmetric setting.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics - Volume 44, Issue 11, 1 December 2008, Pages 1219-1231
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics - Volume 44, Issue 11, 1 December 2008, Pages 1219-1231
نویسندگان
Matthias Kräkel,