کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
967235 | 931179 | 2007 | 23 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
An investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We propose a simple framework for analyzing a continuum of monetary policy rules characterized by differing degrees of credibility, in which commitment and discretion become special cases of what we call quasi-commitment. The monetary policy authority is assumed to formulate optimal commitment plans, to be tempted to renege on them, and to succumb to this temptation with a constant exogenous probability known to the private sector. By interpreting this probability as a continuous measure of the (lack of) credibility of the monetary policy authority, we investigate the welfare effect of a marginal increase in credibility. Our main finding is that, in a simple model of the monetary transmission mechanism, most of the gains from commitment accrue at relatively low levels of credibility.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Monetary Economics - Volume 54, Issue 2, March 2007, Pages 302-324
Journal: Journal of Monetary Economics - Volume 54, Issue 2, March 2007, Pages 302-324
نویسندگان
Ernst Schaumburg, Andrea Tambalotti,