کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
968478 931584 2006 19 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The effects of management compensation on firm hedging: Does SFAS 133 matter?
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
The effects of management compensation on firm hedging: Does SFAS 133 matter?
چکیده انگلیسی

This paper analyzes whether executive compensation in the form of options or stocks affects a firm's decision to hedge. In particular, we investigate whether SFAS 133, a regulation designed to increase transparency of derivative reporting, alters the relationship between managerial compensation and derivative use. We demonstrate that when management is compensated with options, the firm uses less derivatives to hedge interest rate and currency risk. Whereas, compensation of management with shares increases a firm's hedging activity. Results thus highlight the importance of agency conflict in the payment of managerial options and the firm's use of hedging instruments. Passage of SFAS 133 significantly affects derivative use and agency conflict.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Multinational Financial Management - Volume 16, Issue 5, December 2006, Pages 475–493
نویسندگان
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