کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
970545 | 1479572 | 2007 | 12 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Social preferences in wage bargaining: A corporatist approach
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
The starting point for this paper is the stress laid by a branch of literature about corporatist systems on the role of cooperation and consensus in wage bargaining for reaching better economic performances. In order to model a cooperative regime within the classical framework where the monopoly union controls wages and the firm controls employment, we introduce social preferences with some degree of other-regarding concern (ORC), such that each agent's objective function is a linear combination of its own and the other's welfare. The results show that under specific conditions depending on the degree of ORC, an employment level higher than in the selfish case as well as wage moderation can be obtained.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: The Journal of Socio-Economics - Volume 36, Issue 1, February 2007, Pages 90–101
Journal: The Journal of Socio-Economics - Volume 36, Issue 1, February 2007, Pages 90–101
نویسندگان
Giuseppina Autiero, Bruna Bruno,