Effects of eligibility screening in the sickness insurance: Evidence from a field experiment

We study the effects of screening stringency in the Swedish sickness insurance system by exploiting a field experiment. The experiment was conducted on 270,000 individuals in two geographical areas with the treatment group randomized by date of birth. The screening of eligibility was reduced for the treated by the postponement of the requirement for a doctor's certificate from day eight to day fifteen in a sickness benefit spell. The results show that extending the waiting period increased the length of sickness absence by on average 0.6 days. The experiment increased sickness benefit expenses but reduced the number of visits to a doctor. Our results show that postponing the requirement for a doctor's certificate increases public expenses for the sickness insurance system.

► Study the effects of screening stringency by exploiting a large field experiment.
► We find strong effects of early screening in the sickness insurance system.
► Supports earlier evidence of pre treatment effects in the unemployment insurance.