کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
972379 | 932572 | 2006 | 9 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
ریاضیات کاربردی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation](/preview/png/972379.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
Any social welfare function f-whether transitive-valued or not-induces a social choice function g as follows: If at profile p in the domain of f there is a feasible alternative x that is “strictly greater than” every other feasible alternative according to f(p) then we set g(p)Â =Â x. The domain of g is the set of all such profiles p, whether or not f(p) is acyclic. We specify a condition on a social welfare function that is necessary and sufficient for the induced social choice rule to be invulnerable to manipulation by any individual or coalition, and we generalize to an arbitrary collection of coalitions-including the family of singleton coalitions.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 51, Issue 1, January 2006, Pages 81-89
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 51, Issue 1, January 2006, Pages 81-89
نویسندگان
Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly,