کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
9724138 | 1476928 | 2005 | 21 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Choosing the size of the public sector under rent seeking from state coffers
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Choosing the size of the public sector under rent seeking from state coffers Choosing the size of the public sector under rent seeking from state coffers](/preview/png/9724138.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper incorporates rent seeking from state coffers into a general equilibrium model of economic growth and endogenous policy. Self-interested individuals try to extract, for personal benefit, part of tax revenues that could be used to finance public investment. We solve for a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in individual agents' behavior. The determinants of rent seeking in general equilibrium are identified and we consider the efficient size of public sector given the rent-seeking activity. Cross-country data from 108 rich and developing countries provide support for our predictions.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: European Journal of Political Economy - Volume 21, Issue 4, December 2005, Pages 830-850
Journal: European Journal of Political Economy - Volume 21, Issue 4, December 2005, Pages 830-850
نویسندگان
Hyun Park, Apostolis Philippopoulos, Vanghelis Vassilatos,