کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
9724195 1476930 2005 4 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Collective contests with externalities: corrigendum
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Collective contests with externalities: corrigendum
چکیده انگلیسی
Sanghack Lee and J. Hyeong Kang [Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 14 (1998) 727-738] analysed externalities in group contests. The contest in their paper is modelled as a two-stage game. In the first stage, an intragroup sharing-rule parameter is chosen such that the group's aggregate payoff is maximised. In the second stage, each participant in the contest decides about his or her payoff-maximising outlay. The outlays in the group contest are compared to the outlays in an comparable individual contest. The authors derived incorrect results based on an arithmetic error in Eqs. (17) and (18) on page 735. In this corrigendum, the correct results are presented.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: European Journal of Political Economy - Volume 21, Issue 2, June 2005, Pages 533-536
نویسندگان
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