کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
9727368 | 1479753 | 2005 | 16 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Backward induction with players who doubt others' faultlessness
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
ریاضیات کاربردی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Backward induction with players who doubt others' faultlessness Backward induction with players who doubt others' faultlessness](/preview/png/9727368.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
We investigate the robustness of the backward-induction outcome, in binary-action extensive-form games, to the introduction of small mistakes in reasoning. Specifically, when a player contemplates the best action at a future decision node, she assigns some small probability to the event that other players may reach a different conclusion when they carry out the same analysis. We show that, in a long centipede game, the prediction that players do not cooperate fails under this perturbation. Importantly, this result does not depend on forward induction or reputation reasoning. It particular, it applies to finite horizon overlapping generations models with fiat money.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 50, Issue 3, November 2005, Pages 252-267
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 50, Issue 3, November 2005, Pages 252-267
نویسندگان
Aviad Heifetz, Ady Pauzner,