کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
972749 932673 2010 9 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Strategy-proofness and weighted voting
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه ریاضیات ریاضیات کاربردی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Strategy-proofness and weighted voting
چکیده انگلیسی
A strict social welfare function (SSWF) that always yields an asymmetric binary relation with a single maximal alternative induces a social choice rule on its domain. It is known that if the induced rule is strategy-proof then it can also be generated by a SSWF satisfying non-reversal. This paper proves that a SSWF satisfying anonymity and IIA satisfies non-reversal if and only if it is a weighted voting rule. If there are less than six voters then a SSWF satisfying neutrality and IIA satisfies non-reversal if and only if it is a weighted voting rule, but this equivalence does not hold for more than five voters.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 60, Issue 1, July 2010, Pages 15-23
نویسندگان
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