کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
972908 | 932705 | 2008 | 19 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Strategic militancy and the probability of strikes in union-firm bargaining Strategic militancy and the probability of strikes in union-firm bargaining](/preview/png/972908.png)
The paper provides a model that explains the probability of strikes by the union's use of militancy as a strategic tool in bargaining. Militants are useful because they provide a credible threat, hence enhancing the union's bargaining position. Using a multi-stage bargaining game, we show that, in general, militants will be used by the union as a strategic tool. The strategic benefit of militancy is reflected by the fact that the wage and employment level will be higher in a union that uses militants, compared to a union that does not. We use the model to show that the level of militancy and the probability of a strike decrease with the union's power. This suggests that policies that increase the strength of the union will have, at least, a partial positive effect on social welfare. We also show that the model can be viewed as providing an equilibrium of a repeated game, an interpretation that can explain the probability of strikes even in the absence of militants.
Journal: Labour Economics - Volume 15, Issue 3, June 2008, Pages 315–333