کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
972909 | 932705 | 2008 | 16 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Holdup in oligopsonistic labour markets - a new role for the minimum wage
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Holdup in oligopsonistic labour markets - a new role for the minimum wage Holdup in oligopsonistic labour markets - a new role for the minimum wage](/preview/png/972909.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
We consider a labour market model of oligopsonistic wage competition and show that there is a holdup problem although workers do not have any bargaining power. When a firm invests more, it pays a higher wage in order to attract workers from competitors. Because workers participate in the returns on investment while only firms bear the costs, investment is inefficiently low. A binding minimum wage can achieve the first-best level of investment, both in the short run for a given number of firms and in the long run when the number of firms is endogenous.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Labour Economics - Volume 15, Issue 3, June 2008, Pages 334–349
Journal: Labour Economics - Volume 15, Issue 3, June 2008, Pages 334–349
نویسندگان
Leo Kaas, Paul Madden,