کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
973020 | 1479852 | 2016 | 18 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
• Male-only boards significantly increase corporate risk-taking.
• State-controlled firms are less willing to take risk.
• Chinese firms show an increase in corporate risk taking after 2005.
• Governments need to promote gender diversity in boardrooms.
Corporate risk-taking activities among Chinese corporations generally increase with the presence of male-only boards but are mitigated by state ownership. The positive relation between corporate risk-taking and male dominance in boardrooms became more prominent after the Government reduced its ownership control following the Non-Tradable Share (NTS) reform launched in 2005. The reduction in corporate risk-taking through state ownership tends to weaken after the NTS reform. Our results are robust to endogeneity issues and highlight the benefit of gender diversity in alleviating excess corporate risk-taking behavior, especially in countries with relatively weaker overall investor protection.
Journal: Pacific-Basin Finance Journal - Volume 39, September 2016, Pages 141–158