Dilemma game structure hidden in traffic flow at a bottleneck due to a 2 into 1 lane junction

Following Yamauchi’s study [A. Yamauchi, J. Tanimoto, A. Hagishima, H. Sagara, Dilemma game structure observed in traffic flow at a 2-to-1 lane junction, Physical Review E 79 (2009) 036104], we find that several social dilemma structures are represented by nn-person Prisoner’s Dilemma (nn-PD) games in certain traffic flow phases at a bottleneck caused by a lane-closing section. In this study, the stochastic Nishinari–Fukui–Schadschneider (S-NFS) model was adopted as a cellular automaton traffic model. In the system, two classes of driver-agents coexist: C-Agents (cooperative strategy) always driving in the first lane, and D-Agents (defective strategy) trying to drive in a lower-density lane, whether the first or the second lane. In relatively high-density flow phases, such as the metastable phase and the high-density phase, we found nn-PD games, where D-Agents’ interruption into the first lane from the second just before the lane-closing section creates a heavier traffic jam, which reduces social efficiency. This could be solved by decreasing the interruption probability, which can be realized by a provision where drivers in the first lane firmly refuse interruptions.