کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
986867 | 1480896 | 2013 | 11 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |

This paper examines the combined effect of asymmetric information and private entrepreneurial risk aversion on investment decisions. The standard optimal debt contract becomes modified by the introduction of insurance and a risk premium that entrepreneurs demand due to the uncertainty of their investment returns: the private equity premium. In general equilibrium, the private equity premium may become a mechanism that magnifies the effects of shocks. A structural estimation of the model's parameters using Chilean and U.S. data shows that the entrepreneurial risk aversion assumption has more empirical relevance in an economy where smaller privately-held businesses are relatively more prevalent than where the corporate sector predominates, like the U.S.
Journal: Review of Financial Economics - Volume 22, Issue 4, November 2013, Pages 158–168