Subnational Climate Justice? Adaptation Finance Distribution and Climate Vulnerability

• Subnational distributive dynamics of adaptation finance in Malawi.
• Models recipient need (vulnerability) and government interest (patronage).
• Climate risk is negatively related to adaptation finance distribution.
• Government interest is inversely related to adaptation finance distribution.
• Donor utility and the absorptive capacity of districts drive distribution.

SummaryThis article investigates subnational adaptation finance distribution within Malawi. Malawi is highly climate vulnerable and a significant per-capita recipient of adaptation finance. This empirical study models distribution dynamics through “need” (climate vulnerability) and “government interest” (patronage). Results indicate those areas most in need receive relatively little finance. Rather, donor utility and the ability to absorb capital offer the most persuasive explanations for distribution across the state. These findings suggest that the distribution of adaptation funds do not support the larger goal of climate justice.