Development of modified rational buyer auction for procurement of ancillary services utilizing participation matrix

The rational buyer auction is based on a simultaneous auction that is the redesigned auction mechanism for ancillary services by the California independent system operator (CAISO). The incentive for the rational buyer auction is CAISO's intent to adopt a common sense rule of substituting higher-quality lower-cost services for lower-quality higher-cost services, when it results in reduced total procurement cost. For the purposes of designing a desirable auction where the minimum cost for the objective function as well as prevention of price reversal are achieved, either the payment cost in marginal pricing auction must be lowered or price reversal in rational buyer auction must be avoided. The objectives of this study are (a) to develop a newly proposed “modified rational buyer” auction that does not allow price reversal and (b) to propose and validate a solution procedure that is based on participation matrix and discrete programming. The validation of the proposed solution procedure is accomplished through examination of two case studies available in the literature. Based on the first case study data, it is shown that the newly developed modified rational buyer auction avoids price reversal occurrence, while the total payment of ISO is increased by 5.8%, as compared with rational buyer auction. Also in comparison with marginal pricing auction, the ISO payment is lowered by 38.8%, when the newly developed modified rational buyer auction is utilized. For future work, it is recommended that the application of the modified rational buyer auction to joint dispatch of energy and ancillary services is investigated.