Keywords: C72; C92; D72; Asymmetric contest; Discouragement effect; Disappointment aversion; Laboratory experiment;
مقالات ISI (ترجمه نشده)
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Keywords: C72; D72; D74; Contest; Homogeneity of degree zero; Equivalence;
Keywords: C72; D7; D72; Organization; Group; Collusion; Public good;
Keywords: D72; Costly voting; Endogenous participation models;
Keywords: Education; Political ideology; Europe; Compulsory education reforms; D72; I26;
Keywords: Free trade agreement; Political economy; Electoral competition; Electoral system; Japan; F13; D72;
Keywords: D72; J15; N45; N95; O15; Z1; Cultural distance; Local public goods; Primary education; Quasi-exogenous migration;
Keywords: D72; J15; N31Immigrants; Voting; Political mobilization; Political participation; Group size
Keywords: D72; C93; M37Voter turnout; Negative campaigning; Comparative advertising; Fundraising; Field experiment
Keywords: C91; C92; D53; D63; D72; K40Impersonal exchange; Third-party enforcement; Steps of reasoning; Other-regarding preferences
Keywords: D72; D81; D83; H74; Voluntary disclosure; Risk; Political economy; Information transmission; Municipal debt;
Keywords: D03; D62; D72; H23Lab experiments; Externalities; Support for taxation; Intertemporal choice
Keywords: Real earnings management; Accrual-based earnings management; Substitution of earnings management strategies; Political connection; Public monitoringM4; M41; D72; F5
Keywords: D72; L82Elections; Interest groups; Media; Campaign finance
Equilibrium in the symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest: Uniqueness and characterization
Keywords: C72; D72; D74; Contests; Mixed-strategy equilibrium; Rent dissipation; Uniqueness;
The axiom of equivalence to individual power and the Banzhaf index
Keywords: C71; D72; Simple games; Banzhaf power index; Semivalues; 2-efficiency; Superadditivity; Transfer; Symmetry; Positivity; Dummy;
Random interactions in the Chamber: Legislators' behavior and political distance
Keywords: Voting behavior; Social interaction; Political distance; Decision-making; D72; D73; N41;
Debt and damages: What are the chances of staying under the 2°C warming threshold?
Keywords: Ecological macroeconomics; Stock-flow consistency; Climate change; Integrated assessment; Debt; C51; D72; E12; O13; Q51; Q54;
The conditional Shapley-Shubik measure for ternary voting games
Keywords: C71; D72; Cooperative games; Ternary voting games; Ordinal equivalence; Shapley-Shubik index; Postulates of power measures;
(Un-)intended effects of fiscal rules
Keywords: H72; H74; H77; D72; K39; Fiscal rules; Political budget cycles; Elections; Fiscal shocks; Evasion;
Downs meets d'Aspremont and company: Convergence versus differentiation in politics and the media
Keywords: Media positions; Political platforms; Polarization; Spatial competition; Cognitive consistency; D43; D72; L13; L82;
The lottery contest is a best-response potential game
Keywords: C62; C72; D72; Potential games; Tullock contest; Best-response equivalence; Zero-sum games;
“Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests
Keywords: C72; D72; D74; Contest design; Multiple winner; Group-size; Selection mechanism;
Global samaritans? Donor election cycles and the allocation of humanitarian aid
Keywords: Humanitarian aid; Election cycles; Aid allocation; F35; D72; H5; O19;
Government intervention in the capital allocation process: Excess employment as an IPO selection rule in China
Keywords: D72; E24; G32; G34; Local government; Initial public offering; Labor market; Excess labor; Capital allocation; China;
The hidden perils of affirmative action: Sabotage in handicap contests
Keywords: C3; C72; D72; D74; J24; Sabotage; Contests; Contest design; Superstars; Handicapping; Horse racing;
Compulsory voting, turnout, and government spending: Evidence from Austria
Keywords: H10; D72; P16; Compulsory voting; Fiscal policy; Incentives to vote;
“Read my lips! (but only if I was elected)!” Experimental evidence on the effects of electoral competition on promises, shirking and trust
Keywords: D72; D02; D03; C71; C91; Elections; Promises; Shirking; Trust game;
Why don't voters 'put the Gini back in the bottle'? Inequality and economic preferences for redistribution
Keywords: Redistribution; Inequality; Median voter model; Incomplete markets; D72; E60; H23;
Political philosophy, executive constraint and electoral rules
Keywords: Executive constraint; Legal origins; Majoritarian rules; Proportional representation; Redistribution; D72; K40; P16;
Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions Redux
Keywords: D44; D82; D72; All-pay auctions; Asymmetries; Contests; Correlated signals; Interdependent valuations;
Stochastic asymmetric Blotto games: An experimental study
Keywords: C72; C73; C92; D72; D74; Colonel Blotto game; Contests; Resourceallocation; Lotteries; Electoral college; Game theory; Political theory; Experimental economics;
Is the SEC captured? Evidence from comment-letter reviews
Keywords: Comment letters; Political connections; Regulatory capture; SEC enforcement; D72; G18; M41; M48;
Partisan politics: The empirical evidence from OECD panel studies
Keywords: Partisan politics; Government ideology; Economic policy-making; Declining electoral cohesion; Panel data models; Causal effects; D72; H00; C23;
Coasean bargaining in the presence of Pigouvian taxation
Keywords: D62; D72; H23; Q50Coasean bargaining; Pigouvian taxation
Creative accounting and electoral motives: Evidence from OECD countries
Keywords: Stock-flow adjustments; Creative accounting; Public debt; Political business cycles; D72; E62; H62; H63; H83; P16;
The economics of violence in natural states
Keywords: C72; D02; D60; D72; D74; O17; P48; Violence; Institutions; Natural state; Limited access order; Appropriation;
The risk of civil conflicts as a determinant of political institutions
Keywords: Institutions; Civil conflict; D72; D74; O17;
La Ciudad de México y su nueva Constitución en el entorno nacional
Keywords: N4; K4; D72; O47; Gobierno, legislación y regulación; Sistema jurÃdico; Modelos económicos de procesos polÃticos; Medición del crecimiento económico; Government, Law and Regulation; Legal System; Economic Models of Political Processes; Measurement
Stochastic asymmetric Blotto games: Some new results
Keywords: C72; C73; D72; D74; Colonel Blotto game; Contests; Resource allocation; Lotteries;
Teaching the economic way of thinking through Op-eds
Keywords: Engagement; Op-ed; Principles of economics; Writing; A11; A13; A22; D01; D7; D72;
Do federal reserve bank presidents have a regional bias?
Keywords: Individual Taylor-type rules; Regional bias; Real-time data; Interest rate preferences; C12; C30; D72; E58;
Freezeout, compensation rules, and voting equilibria
Keywords: D72; K2; Voting games; Compensation; Fairness; Freezeout;
Foreign aid and voting in international organizations: Evidence from the IWC
Keywords: D72; F35; F53; Foreign aid; Vote buying; International organizations;
Axiomatizing multi-prize nested lottery contests: A complete and strict ranking perspective
Keywords: C72; D72; D74; Multi-prize contest; Contest ranking function; Nested lottery contest; Independence from irrelevant contestants; Independence from irrelevant ranks;
Hyperbolic memory discounting and the political business cycle
Keywords: Hyperbolic memory discounting; Jost's Second Law of Forgetting; Political business cycle; Inflation; Unemployment; D03; D72;
Revisiting the link between PAC contributions and lobbying expenditures
Keywords: Interest groups; Campaign finance; Contributions; Lobbying; Trade policy; Free Trade Agreements; D72; P16;
Does the Greenspan era provide evidence on leadership in the FOMC?
Keywords: C15; C53; D72; E58; Federal Reserve Districts; Greenspan era; Real-time data; Individual reaction functions; Bootstrap;
Economy-wide impacts of REDD when there is political influence
Keywords: D50; D72; O13; Q23; Q28; Q54; Q58; REDD; Political influence; General equilibrium; Climate change; Sustainable forest management;
Condorcet Jury Theorem: An example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation
Keywords: C72; D71; D72; D82; Condorcet Jury Theorem; Information aggregation; Large Poisson games;