کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5059370 | 1371782 | 2014 | 4 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Condorcet Jury Theorem: An example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Recent research on the Condorcet Jury Theorem has proven that informative voting (that is, voting according to one's signal) is not necessarily rational. With two alternatives, rational voting typically leads to the election of the correct alternative, in spite of the fact that not all voters vote informatively. We prove that with three alternatives, there are cases in which informative voting is rational and yet leads to the election of a wrong alternative.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Economics Letters - Volume 125, Issue 1, October 2014, Pages 25-28
Journal: Economics Letters - Volume 125, Issue 1, October 2014, Pages 25-28
نویسندگان
Johanna M.M. Goertz, François Maniquet,