دانلود مقالات ISI درباره G30 + ترجمه فارسی

Incentives for CEOs with multitasks: Evidence from Chinese state-owned enterprises

Keywords: D82; J33; J41; M12; L2; L3; P5; G30; CEO compensation; Agency; Multitask; Complementarity; State-owned enterprises;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 23 صفحه سال انتشار : 2005 سفارش ترجمه

Executive pay in Japan: the role of bank-appointed monitors and the Main Bank relationship

Keywords: J33; G30; J44; L63; Executive pay; Tournaments; Agency; Monitoring; Main Bank relationship;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 24 صفحه سال انتشار : 2005 سفارش ترجمه

Post-listing underperformance: Is it really bad to move trading locations?

Keywords: G14; G30; Post-listing puzzle; Long-term abnormal returns; Pseudo market timing;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 24 صفحه سال انتشار : 2005 سفارش ترجمه

Outside directors and corporate board decisions

Keywords: Cadbury; CEO; Directors; Governance; UK; G32; G34; G30; K22;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 24 صفحه سال انتشار : 2005 سفارش ترجمه

Employee stock options as warrants

Keywords: G13; G30; Employee stock options; Capital structure; Agency theory; Corporate finance;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 25 صفحه سال انتشار : 2005 سفارش ترجمه

The impact of junior debt issuance on senior unsecured debt's risk premiums

Keywords: G30; G32; Junior debt; Security issuance;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 25 صفحه سال انتشار : 2005 سفارش ترجمه

The costs of entrenched boards

Keywords: G30; G34; K22; Corporate governance; Tobin's Q; Firm value; Agency costs; Boards; Directors; Takeovers; Tender offers; Mergers and acquisitions; Proxy fights; Defensive tactics; Antitakeover provisions; Staggered boards; Poison pills;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 25 صفحه سال انتشار : 2005 سفارش ترجمه

Backing into being public: an exploratory analysis of reverse takeovers

Keywords: G30; G33; G34; Going public; Takeovers; Financial distress; Agency theory;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 26 صفحه سال انتشار : 2005 سفارش ترجمه

Exercise behavior, valuation, and the incentive effects of employee stock options

Keywords: G30; G34; J31; J33; Executive compensation; Option exercises; Employee stock options; Corporate governance;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 26 صفحه سال انتشار : 2005 سفارش ترجمه

Executive stock options and incentive effects due to systematic risk

Keywords: G13; J33; G30; G39; Executive stock options; Risk incentives; Systematic risk; GARCH;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 27 صفحه سال انتشار : 2005 سفارش ترجمه

Commitment or entrenchment?: Controlling shareholders and board composition

Keywords: G30; G32; L22; Board composition; Ownership; Control; Corporate governance;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 29 صفحه سال انتشار : 2005 سفارش ترجمه

Financing choices of firms in EU accession countries

Keywords: G30; G32; O12; O52; EU; Transition countries; Capital structure; Dynamic adjustment model;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 32 صفحه سال انتشار : 2005 سفارش ترجمه

Corporate governance practices, CEO characteristics and firm performance

Keywords: Corporate governance practices; CEO characteristics; Firm performance; G30; G32; G34;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 32 صفحه سال انتشار : 2005 سفارش ترجمه

Why do some firms give stock options to all employees?: An empirical examination of alternative theories

Keywords: G30; J33; J41; Employee compensation; Stock options; Incentives; Sorting; Retention;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 35 صفحه سال انتشار : 2005 سفارش ترجمه

Why individual investors want dividends

Keywords: G30; G35; G38; Dividends; Individual investors; Survey;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 38 صفحه سال انتشار : 2005 سفارش ترجمه

Dynamic risk management: Theory and evidence

Keywords: G30; G32; G33; Dynamic risk management; Maturity choice; Hedge ratio; Distress; Transaction costs;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 45 صفحه سال انتشار : 2005 سفارش ترجمه