کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
9553224 | 1375193 | 2005 | 24 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Executive pay in Japan: the role of bank-appointed monitors and the Main Bank relationship
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
A feature of tournament models is that executive compensation is not independent of the wages paid at lower levels of the corporate hierarchy. Agency models show that compensation based on firm performance is a means by which incentives can be provided to executives once a promotion tournament has been resolved. In this paper, we combine elements of both models and show that the existence of an outsider who monitors the firm's activities will lower the sensitivity of pay to firm performance for top executives and reduce the importance of tournament-based incentives. Using panel data for 55 Japanese electronics firms, we find support for the notion that bank-appointed Board members help monitor top executives and that tournament considerations are a particularly important feature of executive compensation in Japan.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Japan and the World Economy - Volume 17, Issue 3, August 2005, Pages 371-394
Journal: Japan and the World Economy - Volume 17, Issue 3, August 2005, Pages 371-394
نویسندگان
Naohito Abe, Noel Gaston, Katsuyuki Kubo,