کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
1019222 | 940409 | 2007 | 9 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Are family managers agents or stewards? An exploratory study in privately held family firms
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
کسب و کار و مدیریت بین المللی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Are family managers agents or stewards? An exploratory study in privately held family firms Are family managers agents or stewards? An exploratory study in privately held family firms](/preview/png/1019222.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
Family business researchers are split on whether family managers in family firms are agents or stewards. If family managers behave as agents, family firms are expected to impose agency cost control mechanisms on them, and this will improve performance. The results based on a sample of small privately held family firms indicate that family managers are monitored and provided with incentive compensation. Those who do so obtain higher performance, thus suggesting the existence of agency behavior among family managers.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Business Research - Volume 60, Issue 10, October 2007, Pages 1030–1038
Journal: Journal of Business Research - Volume 60, Issue 10, October 2007, Pages 1030–1038
نویسندگان
James J. Chrisman, Jess H. Chua, Franz W. Kellermanns, Erick P.C. Chang,