Game theory-based identification of facility use restrictions for the movement of hazardous materials under terrorist threat

Government agencies can determine which specific facilities in a transportation network to restrict for each class of material and for which times of the day and/or week to stem the consequences of a terrorist event. To guide in making these determinations, this paper develops a three-player game of the interactions among a government agency, a carrier, and a terrorist. It also develops an effective solution procedure for this game and illustrates the use of that procedure on a realistic case study based on the freight rail network in the continental United States.

► We use game theory to model the interactions between a government agency, a carrier and a terrorist.
► We construct a heuristic solution procedure to quickly identify effective prohibitions.
► We develop a realistic case study based on the rail network in the continental US.
► We show that the simple rule to restrict links based on exposure can lead to very poor solutions.