کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
10475824 | 929408 | 2016 | 26 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Executive overconfidence and compensation structure
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
ساختار غرامت و ساختار جبران اجرایی
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
حسابداری
چکیده انگلیسی
We examine the impact of overconfidence on compensation structure. Our findings support the exploitation hypothesis: firms offer incentive-heavy compensation contracts to overconfident Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) to exploit their positively biased views of firm prospects. Overconfident CEOs receive more option-intensive compensation and this relation increases with CEO bargaining power. Exogenous shocks (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123R) provide additional support for the findings. Overconfident non-CEO executives also receive more incentive-based pay, independent of CEO overconfidence, buttressing the notion that firms tailor compensation contracts to individual behavioral traits such as overconfidence.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 119, Issue 3, March 2016, Pages 533-558
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 119, Issue 3, March 2016, Pages 533-558
نویسندگان
Mark Humphery-Jenner, Ling Lei Lisic, Vikram Nanda, Sabatino Dino Silveri,