Keywords: Deferred compensation; Executive compensation; Principal-agent model; G34; J33; M52;
مقالات ISI (ترجمه نشده)
مقالات زیر هنوز به فارسی ترجمه نشده اند.
در صورتی که به ترجمه آماده هر یک از مقالات زیر نیاز داشته باشید، می توانید سفارش دهید تا مترجمان با تجربه این مجموعه در اسرع وقت آن را برای شما ترجمه نمایند.
در صورتی که به ترجمه آماده هر یک از مقالات زیر نیاز داشته باشید، می توانید سفارش دهید تا مترجمان با تجربه این مجموعه در اسرع وقت آن را برای شما ترجمه نمایند.
Keywords: Feedback; Personnel; Motivation; Productivity; Experiment; Incentives; J24; M52; J33; C91; D23;
Keywords: Insider econometrics; Endogeneity of HRM policies; Incentives; Foreign ownership; Banking; Central and Eastern Europe; F23; G21; M52;
Keywords: D86; K31; M52; J33; J79; Contracts; Employer liability; Moral hazard; Incomplete information;
Keywords: Executive stock options; Executive turnover; Early exercise; Executive compensation; Option valuation; C15; G30; M52;
Keywords: Selection contest; Risk aversion; Competitive balance; Gender gap; C72; D72; J31; K41; M51; M52;
Keywords: C92; J31; M52; C73; C51; Experiment; Coordination; Incentive contracts; Selection;
Keywords: G30; M52; Payout policy; Executive compensation; CEO dividend protection;
Keywords: J28; M50; M52; Wage change; Job satisfaction; Anticipation and adaptation;
Keywords: M12; M52; G3; G34; J3; J33; Governance; Boards; Busy; Compensation; Directors;
Keywords: M52; M55; J33; G34; G32; G13; M41; Performance-vesting provisions; Executive compensation; Stock awards; Option awards; Time-vesting; Performance measures; CEO pay; Corporate governance;
Keywords: C91; J16; J24; J31; M52; Affirmative action; Castes; Competitiveness; Unethical behavior; Field experiment;
Keywords: C91; D03; M52; Competition; Experiment; Tournament; Personal development; Psychometric scale;
Keywords: G20; G28; J33; J44; M14; M52; Investment advisors; Agency problems; Textual analysis; Readability;
Keywords: J69; L39; M52; Intention to leave; Post-exit destinations; Turnover intentions; Municipal civic servants; Voluntary job turnover intentions;
Keywords: Financial incentives; Motivation; Crowding; Power; Exploitation; Experiment; C92; J33; M52; M55;
Keywords: C71; D63; L24; M31; M52; Hierarchies; Joint ventures; Resource allocation; Geometric rules; MIT strategy;
Keywords: C93; I29; L20; M14; M52; Q56; Incentives; Sustainability; Education; Sustainable behavior; Field experiment;
Keywords: J33; J41; D86; J4; M52; M51; Self-selection; Contracting; Individual characteristics; Risk preferences; Psychological traits;
Keywords: Narrow bracketing; Multi-stage contest; Framing; Experiment; C72; D81; M52; J33;
Keywords: CEO compensation; CEO incentives; Financial crisis; Financial deregulation; Federal emergency loans; G01; G21; G32; J33; M12; M52;
Keywords: M52; J33; J45; D82; Pay for performance; Public sector management; Information and communication technologies; Asymmetric information; Motivations; Optimal contracts;
Keywords: Executive compensation; Stock options; Money illusion; Expensing; Disclosure; J30; G38; M52;
Keywords: D03; J33; M52; Locus of control; Risk attitude; Performance appraisal; Performance pay; Sorting; Extrinsic rewards; Intrinsic motivation;
Keywords: Performance pay; Nutritional information; Child malnutrition; India; M52; I12; I38; J38,;
Keywords: J33; J54; J63; L74; L85; M52; Shared capitalism employee ownership; Corporate governance; Cost of equity; Cost of debt; Cost of capital; Agency conflicts;
Keywords: C23; J33; M52; D22; Productivity; Team-dynamics; Performance feedback; Team incentives; Sales organizations;
Keywords: D82; J3; J81; J88; M52; Principal-agent model; Working conditions; Regulation; Standards;
Keywords: C92; D03; J33; M52; Corporate Social responsibility; Incentives; Reciprocity; Intentions; Equity; Experiment; Warm glow;
Keywords: C93; I21; I28; M52; Performance pay; Incentive pay; Public schools; Teachers; Field experiment; Primary education; Administrative data; Pakistan;
Keywords: D31; H21; H24; M12; M52; Optimal taxation; Managerial compensation; Span of control;
Keywords: G32; G35; J33; M52; CEO ownership; Dividends; Share repurchases; Stock options;
Keywords: G23; J33; M52; Institutional investors; Executive compensation; Strategic interactions; Executive pay disparity; Geography;
Keywords: CEO compensation; Firm prestige; Social status; Career benefits; G39; M52;
Keywords: J28; J33; J54; J63; J81; M52; Job satisfaction; Wages; Compensation methods; Working conditions;
Keywords: Participation; Labor market; Gift-exchange game; Personnel economics; Reciprocity; C72; C91; J33; L23; M52; M55; 3660;
Keywords: J33; M52; Executive stock options; Incentives; Compensation;
Keywords: C91; J16; M52; Dictator game; Discrimination; Gender wage gap; Laboratory experiment; Real-effort task;
Keywords: G23; M12; M52; Closed-end fund; Pay-performance sensitivity; Risk-taking behavior; Alternative investments; Emerging market;
Keywords: C91; D03; J33; M52; Temptation; Gift exchange; Hidden costs of control; Cyberloafing;
Keywords: J24; M12; M52; Subjective performance evaluation; Middle managers; Incentives; Multitasking;
Keywords: G34; J33; M52; CEO stock ownership guideline; Not-meet adoption; Meet adoption; CEO compensation; Incentive alignment; Stakeholder management; Financial performance;
Keywords: Executive compensation; Signing bonus; Termination risk; Incentive device; J33; M52;
Keywords: Industry tournament incentives; Market for CEO talent; Corporate taxes; Tax aggressiveness; G30; H25; J33; M41; M52;
Keywords: C91; J31; J71; M52; Wages; Discrimination; Social identity; Natural groups; Lab experiment; Gift-exchange; Migrant-workers; China;
Keywords: Relative peer quality; Firm performance; Tournament; Optimal contract; G30; M52;
Keywords: D82; L22; J71; M52; Moral hazard; Team production; Partnerships; Procrastination; Contract design; Discrimination; Deadlines;
Keywords: Overconfidence; Compensation structure; Incentive compensation; J33; M52;
Keywords: Z10; M50; M52; Cultural transmission; Work ethic; Incentives;
Keywords: D82; D86; M52; Monitoring; Dynamic contracts; Managerial compensation; Moral hazard; Endogenous financing constraints;