کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
10477356 | 930283 | 2005 | 17 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Solvency runs, sunspot runs, and international bailouts
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
This paper introduces a model of intervention by an international financial institution (IFI) under asymmetric information. The IFI is unable to distinguish between runs due to fundamentals and those which are the result of pure sunspots. However, it maximizes global welfare by offering a relending package consistent with generating a separating equilibrium, where voluntary creditor participation implies that underlying fundamentals are good. The need for direct IFI lending in the package is shown to depend on the commitment capacity of creditors. This adverse selection problem provides an alternative rationale for Bagehot's Principle of last-resort lending at high rates of interest to the moral hazard motivation commonly found in the literature.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of International Economics - Volume 65, Issue 1, January 2005, Pages 203-219
Journal: Journal of International Economics - Volume 65, Issue 1, January 2005, Pages 203-219
نویسندگان
Mark M. Spiegel,