کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
10493457 940419 2005 11 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Institutional ownership and CEO compensation: a longitudinal examination
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری کسب و کار و مدیریت بین المللی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Institutional ownership and CEO compensation: a longitudinal examination
چکیده انگلیسی
Limited research has looked at how the aspects of institutional ownership affect executive compensation. Using an agency theory approach, we investigate how institutional ownership concentration and dispersion affect levels of CEO compensation, pay mix, and stock option pay sensitivity. We find that the largest owner's concentration is associated with lower levels of compensation, as well as with higher ratios of salary to total compensation and lower ratios of options to total compensation, but that the number of blockholders does not predict any aspects of CEO compensation. In addition, institutional ownership dispersion is associated with increased levels of compensation and greater use of incentive compensation. Finally, higher levels of CEO ownership lead to a significant reduction in the level of options compensation, as well as higher ratios of salary to total compensation and lower ratios of options to total compensation.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Business Research - Volume 58, Issue 8, August 2005, Pages 1078-1088
نویسندگان
, , ,