کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
332116 | 545640 | 2013 | 10 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Why must we attribute our own action to ourselves? Auditory hallucination like-experiences as the results both from the explicit self-other attribution and implicit regulation in speech Why must we attribute our own action to ourselves? Auditory hallucination like-experiences as the results both from the explicit self-other attribution and implicit regulation in speech](/preview/png/332116.png)
The sense of agency, which is the awareness that “I am the one who causes action,” is important in understanding passive schizophrenic symptoms and bodily self-consciousness. However, this potential linkage between subjective self-other attribution (explicit agency) and automatic self-monitoring of an action (implicit agency) has not been examined fully. The present study included two experiments conducted with the same group of healthy participants (N=48) in order to examine explicit (Exp. 1) and implicit (Exp. 2) measures of the sense of agency in speech. Exp. 1 suggested that participants who tend not to attribute a fed-back voice to themselves (the other-attribution group) might have a stronger tendency toward auditory hallucinations, as measured by the Auditory Hallucination Experience Scale 17 (AHES-17). Furthermore, the results of Exp. 2 suggested that this other-attribution group might not utilize auditory feedback during speech production, indicating the expected link between explicit and implicit agency. These results are discussed in relation to the sense-of-agency model, wherein people are understood to construct the online “self” monitoring of action.
Journal: Psychiatry Research - Volume 207, Issue 3, 30 May 2013, Pages 179–188