کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
4491435 | 1623262 | 2012 | 14 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
We use a new dataset from war-torn Burundi to explore how various institutional proxies affect investments in soil conservation. We “unbundle” institutions and distinguish between various proxies for tenure security and social norms. While we find significant correlations between certain proxies for tenure and social norms on the one hand, and investments in erosion management on the other, this is not true for all proxies. Using local conflict measures as instruments for institutional quality, we find tentative evidence of a causal effect of tenure security on erosion management, but not on investments improving short-term soil fertility.
► We analyze the relation between institutional quality and investments in soil conservation.
► We “unbundle” institutions, and distinguish between various proxies for tenure security and social norms.
► One dimension of tenure security is an important determinant for erosion management.
► Most social norm proxies are not related to erosion management.
► Neither tenure security nor social norms seem to matter for investments improving short-term soil fertility.
Journal: Agricultural Systems - Volume 108, April 2012, Pages 50–63