کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
469776 | 698353 | 2008 | 7 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: On the price of anarchy for non-atomic congestion games under asymmetric cost maps and elastic demands On the price of anarchy for non-atomic congestion games under asymmetric cost maps and elastic demands](/preview/png/469776.png)
We derive several bounds for the price of anarchy of the noncooperative congestion games with elastic demands and asymmetric linear or nonlinear cost functions. The bounds established depend on a constant from the cost functions as well as the ratio between user benefit and social surplus at Nash equilibrium. The results can be viewed a generalization of that of Chau and Sim [C.K. Chau, K.M. Sim, The price of anarchy for non-atomic congestion games with symmetric cost maps and elastic demands, Operations Research Letters 31 (2003) 327–334] for the symmetric case, or a generalization of Perakis [G. Perakis, The price of anarchy when costs are nonseparable and asymmetric, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 3064 (2004) 46–58] to the elastic demand.
Journal: Computers & Mathematics with Applications - Volume 56, Issue 10, November 2008, Pages 2737–2743