Incentive contracts in delegated portfolio management under VaR constraint

This paper studies the incentive effect of linear performance-adjusted contracts in delegated portfolio management under a value-at-risk (VaR) constraint. It is shown that a linear performance-based contract can provide incentives for the portfolio manager to work at acquiring private information under a VaR risk constraint. The expected utility and optimal effort of a risk-averse manager are increasing functions of the return sharing ratio in the contract. However, a risk constraint causes the portfolio manager to reduce effort in gathering private information, suggesting that the VaR constraint increases the moral hazard between the investor and the manager.

► We study linear contracts of delegated portfolio management under a VaR constraint. ► A linear contract can induce managers to work at acquiring private information. ► Managers' expected utility and optimal effort increase with return sharing ratio. ► A VaR constraint increases the moral hazard between the investor and the manager.