کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5058655 1476626 2015 4 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
اختصاص ارزش در میان بازیکنان دور افتاده در شکل گیری شبکه
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی


- We study the stability of networks when players are farsighted.
- Allocations are determined endogenously.
- We propose the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stability with bargaining.
- Stability singles out the set of strongly efficient networks under some conditions.
- The componentwise egalitarian allocation rule emerges endogenously.

We study the stability of networks when players are farsighted and allocations are determined endogenously. The set of strongly efficient networks is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if the value function is anonymous, component additive and top convex and the allocation rule is anonymous and component efficient. Moreover, the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule emerges endogenously.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Economics Letters - Volume 137, December 2015, Pages 50-53
نویسندگان
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