کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5068154 | 1476900 | 2012 | 9 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |

We analyze survey evidence on individuals' willingness to sanction law violations - such as evading taxes, drunk driving and fare dodging - by disapproval or social exclusion. Our data show that people condition their willingness to sanction a norm violation on their belief about its frequency. The more commonly a norm violation is believed to occur, the lower individuals' inclination to punish it. Our findings are in line with models of social norms and offer an alternative interpretation of the 'broken windows' effect.
⺠We discuss evidence on individuals' willingness to sanction law violations. ⺠Violations with large negative externalities are punished most frequently. ⺠For less harmful behavior, we find a conditional enforcement pattern. ⺠If such a norm violation is considered to be rare, it is less likely sanctioned.
Journal: European Journal of Political Economy - Volume 28, Issue 3, September 2012, Pages 390-398