DiscussionHarassment, corruption and tax policy: A comment on Marjit, Mukherjee and Mukherjee [Eur. J. Political Economy 16 (2000) 75-94]

Our comment on Marjit et al. [Marjit, S., Mukherjee, V., Mukherjee, A., 2000. Harassment, corruption and tax policy. European Journal of Political Economy 16, 75-94.] addresses the equilibrium concept used in the game with imperfect information, Section 4 of the original paper. The solution represented in the original paper does not constitute a perfect Bayesian Nash-equilibrium. We develop an alternative solution of the game given the assumptions made by Marjit et al. [Marjit, S., Mukherjee, V., Mukherjee, A., 2000. Harassment, corruption and tax policy. European Journal of Political Economy 16, 75-94.] and find that the results concerning the optimal amount of over-evaluation of income and the existence of a pooling or separating equilibrium are altered.