کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5068516 1476927 2006 16 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Law enforcement and concentration in illicit drug markets
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Law enforcement and concentration in illicit drug markets
چکیده انگلیسی

In this paper we endogenize the horizontal structure of illicit drug markets. The key assumption is that the trafficker's probability of detection depends on his/her market share. We show that a stricter law enforcement policy encourages traffickers to permit competitors into the market. Increasing deterrence reduces the quantities supplied by each trafficker but also induces new entry, which cancels out the decrease in individual production at the aggregated level. Equilibrium total quantity and criminal profit are independent of the law enforcement level.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: European Journal of Political Economy - Volume 22, Issue 1, March 2006, Pages 99-114
نویسندگان
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