کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5071532 1477064 2016 12 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
کارایی و ثبات وظایف احتمالی در مشکلات ازدواج
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
We study marriage problems where two groups of agents, men and women, match each other and probabilistic assignments are possible. When only ordinal preferences are observable, stochastic dominance efficiency (sd-efficiency) is commonly used. First, we provide a characterization of sd-efficient allocations in terms of a property of an order relation defined on the set of man-woman pairs. Then, using this characterization, we constructively prove that for each probabilistic assignment that is sd-efficient for some ordinal preferences, there is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility profile consistent with the ordinal preferences for which the assignment is Pareto efficient. Second, we show that when the preferences are strict, for each ordinal preference profile and each ex-post stable probabilistic assignment, there is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility profile, consistent with the ordinal preferences, for which the assignment belongs to the core of the associated transferable utility game.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 95, January 2016, Pages 47-58
نویسندگان
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