کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5071541 1477064 2016 10 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
خواص انگیزشی برای مکانیزم های ردیف
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
We study three incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms: (i) strategy-proofness, which requires that no agent gain by misrepresenting his preferences; (ii) adjacent strategy-proofness, which requires that no agent gain by switching the rankings of two adjacent alternatives; and (iii) mistake monotonicity, which requires that the welfare of each agent weakly decrease as he reports increasingly bigger mistakes. Each of these properties has three versions, depending on whether preferences over sure alternatives are extended to preferences over lotteries by the stochastic dominance, downward lexicographic, or upward lexicographic extension. We identify conditions on the preference domain that guarantee the equivalence of these properties. The universal domain and the domains of single-dipped and single-peaked preferences satisfy our conditions.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 95, January 2016, Pages 168-177
نویسندگان
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