کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072860 | 1373520 | 2009 | 21 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Stationary equilibria in bargaining with externalities
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
This paper studies infinite-horizon bargaining between a seller and multiple buyers when externalities are present. We extend the analysis in Jehiel and Moldovanu by allowing for both pure and mixed equilibria [Jehiel, P., Moldovanu, B., 1995a. Cyclical delay in bargaining with externalities. Rev. Econ. Stud. 62, 619-637]. A characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibria in generic games is presented. Equilibria with delay exist only for strong positive externalities. Since each buyer receives a positive payoff when the seller makes an agreement with some other buyer, positive externalities induce a war of attrition between buyers.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 65, Issue 2, March 2009, Pages 318-338
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 65, Issue 2, March 2009, Pages 318-338
نویسندگان
Jonas Björnerstedt, Andreas Westermark,