کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5075600 | 1373925 | 2006 | 15 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |

The determinants of corporate cash holdings in the context of corporate governance theories have recently been analyzed in the literature. In the present study, the behavior of corporate managers in countries with poor shareholder rights protection is more in conformity with the agency problem theory than other corporate governance theories. Also, smaller firms tend to hold larger cash balances relative to their total assets than their larger counterparts. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows in today's highly integrated capital markets act as substitutes for corporate cash holdings. When firms in G-7 countries are separated from the ones in other countries, FDI inflows demonstrate different effects on international corporate cash holdings: They are substitutes for cash holdings in the former group of countries but become complements for cash holdings by firms in the latter one.
Journal: Global Finance Journal - Volume 16, Issue 3, March 2006, Pages 302-316